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The Appellent, Cari Allen, pursuant to Rule 24 (c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, submits the following Reply Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE INFORMATION PRESENTED BY APPELLEES' REQUIRE 
THE COURT TO SET ASIDE THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Appellees' statement of facts, argument and information indicates the extent to which 
the parties differ in their views and underscores genuine issues of material facts remaining in 
dispute. Further, Appellees' have mischaracterized and or misstated much of the information 
about Rex and Renee Strand's divorce proceeding, the information provided by both the 
Appellant and themselves to the Trial Court as well as the effect of those statements and 
information on the ultimate decisions of the Trial Court. Appellant sets forth the following 
for clarification to this Court: 
A. REPLY TO PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
The Appellees' erroneously represent and or infer to this Court throughout their brief 
that the information and allegations contained in the GAL's Memo for TRO was credible, 
fully and fairly investigated and that her motion for TRO was granted. These representations 
are false. The GAL based her motion on the allegations of the accusers, never interviewed 
her clients, nor any one else, but the accusers, and omitted March 18, 2006 exculpatory 
information from her own investigator Olivia Phelps home visit and the Appellees' October 
2005 letters. More importantly, the GAL's Motion, offered and submitted in bad faith, was 
denied and subsequently, shortly after the hearing on said motion, the GAL resigned from 
her position as advocate for the children [See Addendum 9-t3|. Rex Strand's visitation was not 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
modified and he has been exonerated by Utah Court's of all the allegations/charges against 
him. 
B. THE FEBRUARY 2006 LETTERS OF THE APPELLEES' WHEREIN THEY 
ACCUSE ALLEN OF VARIOUS ACTS OF CHILD ABUSE WERE NOT SUBMITTED 
TO THE GAL AS PART OF ANY INVESTIGATION, INTERVIEWS OR INQUIRY AND 
DO NOT MEET THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDING PRIVILEGE. 
In arguing that Allen v. Ortez 802 P. 2d at 1307 (Utah 1990) is distinguishable from 
the facts in the instant case, intent on misleading this Court, throughout the Appellees' brief 
they erroneously represent (for the first time) that: (1) first, due to the high conflict and 
divergent views of the parties, the GAL initiated an investigation to gather independent third 
party information, (2.) second, that as part of that investigation the GAL interviewed the 
Appellees', (3) third, that the Appellees' then submitted to the GAL letters outlining their 
concerns based on said interviews, (4) fourth, then GAL obtained affidavits from the 
Appellees' concerning the living conditions of the minor children, (5) fifth that these letters 
and affidavits were then attached to the GAL's motion for a temporary restraining order 
against Rex Strand. And (6) Thus, the Appellees were acting as witnesses in the Strand 
divorce action. 
First, it should be noted that this particular GAL was not appointed to the divorce case 
until January 30th 2006 and in her memo she complains of numerous phone calls from 
"Respondent, Petitioner, the minor children and extended family members". Neither Rex 
Strand, the Appellant nor Mike Strand ever once contacted or tried to contact the GAL as 
documentd by Rex Strand in his divorce proceeding by supplied phone records and thus her 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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complaints were not directed at them, leaving only Renee Strand and the Appellees' as the 
offending parties. 
The GAL never did return the children's phone calls nor did she ever meet with them or 
interview them regarding the allegations. Secondly, contrary to what the Respondents 
erroneously contend, the undisputed facts, evidence and inferences show that the letters, 
dated mere day's after the GAL's appointment, were unsolicited, and were, in fact, 
submitted to the GAL and others in a misguided effort to use Ms. Allen as a pawn in the 
Appellees' own personal dispute's with Rex Strand because of his failure to acquiesce to 
Appellees' requests to let them take the children to stay at their homes during his visitation, 
where as per the invitations, he could visit but not stay. 
The fact remains, when Rex Strand's children expressed a strong preference to stay at 
Allen's home in November 2005 with their father, and did not want to stay at either of the 
Appellees' homes during their visitation time with their father of which he was not invited, 
both Appellees' who in October 2005 wrote letters in favor of Rex Strand 
\ Dimeo Complaint R. 26-27, Ferrari Complaint R. 25-27], changed their position to that of 
Renee Strand's and this is what in fact led to the Appellees' February 2006 letters. TDimeo 
Complaint R. 2/10, 3/ 11-14, 4/14-151 [Ferrari Complaint R. 2/11-15, 3/16-21, 4/22-231. 
Based on the allegations against Allen and select others, set forth in Appellees' February 
2006 letters, March 23, 2006 affidavits and Renee Strands affidavit dated March 24, 2006, 
the GAL then purportedly conducted an investigation into said allegations which was 
limited to speaking only with the Appellees' and the divorcing petitioner (Renee Strand) who 
each substantiated and corroborated each other's fabricated allegations, and then, and only 
then did the GAT, file her motion. 
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Appellees' February 2006 letters [ Dimeo Complaint R. 29-30, Ferrari Complaint R. 29-
31] do not reference that they were written to outline their concerns based upon a purported 
GAL investigation, interviews or inquiries, in fact on their face the letter's demonstrate that 
the GAL was not aware of who the Appellees' were as the Appellees' each made an 
introduction. Secondly the letter's demonstrate that the GAL was not aware of the facts of 
the divorce proceeding nor the Appellees' allegations or concerns as of the date of their 
letters. Furthermore, Appellee Dimeo's letter was addressed "To whom it may concern". 
Additionally it defies logic that subsequent to her appointment on January 30, 2006, this 
GAL immediately focused all her time, effort and attention to this particular divorce 
proceeding, conducting interviews and inquiries to result in letters, the first of which is dated 
a mere 14 day's after said appointment. 
An examination of the documents and evidence submitted to the Trial Court, the trial 
transcript and the Court's order exhibits that the Appellees' never raised the issue that said 
letters were purportedly written and sent to the GAL in February 2006 as part of an 
investigation, based on interview's and or inquiries and clearly demonstrate that the Trial 
Court did not make such a finding. 
The Utah appellate court has reiterated many times that they will not consider issues 
raised for the first time on Appeal. Appellant maintains that that the letters were unsolicited, 
sent to the GAL and others before any purported investigation, interviews and inquiries, thus 
the similarities between the letters written and distributed by the Appellees' in February 2006 
and the letters written by the social worker in Allen v. Ortez are indistinguishable. 
In Allen v. Ortez, the Defendants moved to dismiss on two grounds. First, they claimed 
that Utah's child abuse reporting statutes grant them immunity for the letters and second, 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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they claimed that no libel charge could be based on the letters sent to Mr. Ortez's attorney 
and to the commissioner because the common law privileges statements made by witnesses 
and other participants in the course of a judicial proceeding. In the case at bar, the 
Appellees' moved to dismiss Cari Allen's complaint only on the ground of the common law 
privilege. Now, without ever asserting that the reports were made in good faith to either the 
Trial Court or this Court, (as the social worker did in Allen v. Ortez), Appellees' 
erroneously contend to this Court an issue that they never made to the Trial Court, that being 
that their reports of child abuse made to the Guardian ad litem should suffice as a report 
made pursuant to Utah's Child abuse reporting statutes. l However, the Utah Supreme 
Court in Allen v. Ortez weighed heavily on the relevance and strict adherence to immunity 
given by Utah's child abuse reporting statutes in such instances and resolved these issues, 
reiterating that: " We must not give the statute a broader interpretation than is necessary to 
effectuate its purposes. To do otherwise would be to sanction potentially widespread libel." . 
Moreover, as also succinctly stated by Allen v. Ortez, the purpose of the child abuse 
reporting statutes is to facilitate detection, investigation, prosecution, and prevention of child 
abuse by governmental agencies charged with those responsibilities, and the Appellees' 
erroneous interpretation of Utah's child abuse reporting statutes does not conform to the 
actual language which designates that reports can only be made and must be made to 
peace officers, law enforcement agencies or office of division of family services. It is the 
This issue is also mirrored in an article in the Salt Lake Tribune where a prosecuting attorney 
resigned after he was charged by the State of Utah for receiving information of child abuse and did not 
pass it on to DFS as prescribed by law. [ See Addendum^ 
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divisions preview to inform GAL's of allegations, after they conduct an investigation, not 
accusers seeking to avert the statutes and incite a biased GAL investigation (this is not an 
informal nicety it is Utah state law). As a matter of law, Guardian ad litem's are not the 
governmental agencies charged with the responsibilities as outlined in said statutes, in fact, 
Guardian ad litem's are completely omitted from Utah's Child Abuse reporting/ investigating 
statutes for good cause. 
Comparable to this case, wherein the Appellees' sent letters to the children's attorney 
and argue that in sending the letter's they were acting as potential witnesses in a future 
custody modification proceeding, in Allen v. Ortez, the social worker sent the letters and 
reports to the Commissioner and to the father's counsel in the divorce proceeding and argued 
that in sending the letters, she was acting as a potential witness in the already initiated 
custody modification proceeding. On review, the Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Ortez, 
concluded that as a matter of law the social worker was not acting as a potential witness and 
found that neither she nor any of the other defendants could satisfy the third element of 
judicial privilege. As such, this precedent renders Appellees' arguments moot, they could 
not and cannot satisfy the third element with regard to these letters. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Allen v. Ortez also concluded that there was no need to 
determine whether the first and second elements of the privilege are met because the social 
worker was not a witness at the time she sent the letters, and found that neither she nor any 
of the other defendants whose liability is dependent upon her was entitled to claim the 
common law privilege. Because the Appellees' were not witnesses at the time they sent their 
February 2006 letters they also are not entitled to claim, nor avail themselves of the common 
law privilege. 
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For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in Allen's initial Brief, this court must, 
therefore, reverse and remand. 
C. THE AFFIDAVIT'S OF THE APPELLEES' PREPARED BY THE GAL WHICH 
SHE THEN RELIED UPON TO SUPPORT HER MOTION WHEREIN APPELLEES' 
ACCUSE ALLEN OF VARIOUS ACTS OF CHILD ABUSE DO NOT MEET THE 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING PRIVILEGE. 
Both Appellees' deliberately, willfully and maliciously, under oath made multiple 
false statements about Allen in their affidavits. They did so in order to substantiate the 
fabrications in their February 2006 letters and to provide false evidence for the GAL solely 
for the purpose of inducing her to act upon it, instigating themselves the custody 
modification proceeding in order to satisfy their own ulterior motives. The content's of their 
affidavits parrots their February 2006 letters and were put forth to buttresses Renee Strands 
claims against Rex Strand in which Rex Strand has been exonerated in Utah Courts. The bad 
faith statements made by the Appellees' were in violation of the child abuse reporting 
statutes and had a duality of purpose, not only to cost Rex Strand his visitation rights but to 
also generate future criminal charges against Allen without the benefit of DFS or law 
enforcement involvement, legitimate investigation or due process rights. 
The Appellees' had no value as witnesses to the GAL's motion which the Appellees' 
represent to this Court, the GAL filed on the basis that Rex Strand purportedly persisted in 
involving the minor children in the divorce, (a far cry from the allegations of child abuse). 
Further, any purported information Appellees' could give about conversations, behavior, 
etc.. that purportedly took place privately between the Appellant, Rex Strand and his 
children would surely be inadmissible hearsay as neither Appellant was a witness to the 
claims they assert, fabricated and concocted. 
7 
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More importantly, as per the Appellees', the GAL's motion, investigation and 
inquiries were sparked by this wrongful assertion of involving the minor children in the 
divorce and exhibits that the Appellees' letters preceded said complaint by approximately 30 
days, and said letters omit any reference of any attempt to involve or inform the children of 
events concerning the divorce proceeding. 
As this allegation was not raised by the Appellees' February 2006 letter's and in fact 
was blindly raised for the first time in Appellee Ferrari's March 23, 2006 affidavit, in an 
effort to substantiate Ferrari's blind assertion where no example was given, Renee Strand's 
March 24, 2006 affidavit alleged that Emily Strand was purportedly exposed to her (Renee 
Strand's ) March 23, 2006 affidavit. In her motion, the GAL relies on Renee Strand's 
affidavit and substantiates it through Ferrari's (premature) affidavit. Thus, these facts 
conclude that any investigation into an act that could not have taken place on or before 
March 23, 2006 in fact had to take place after said date. Since the GAL's motion was filed on 
March 27, 2006 it can be concluded that said investigation and inquiries never have occurred. 
Since Ferrari's affidavit with this allegation was dated March 23,2006 and Renee Strand's 
subsequent affidavit dated March 24, 2006 complains about Emily being exposed to her 
(Renee Strand's) March 23, 2006 affidavit, taking into consideration mailing time to Rex 
Strand's attorney and then dissemination to Rex Strand, the time line is obviously flawed 
rendering the concocted allegation of Ferrari premature and erroneous, as neither Allen nor 
Rex Strand had possession or access to Renee Strand's March 23, 2006 affidavit the day it 
was filed nor the day after, rendering Renee Strand's March 24, 2006 allegation and sworn 
substantiation erroneous as well. Moreover, allegations of exposing Emily to an affidavit is 
far removed from the allegations of child abuse that the Appellees' accused Allen with. 
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Appellee's affidavits were not admitted into evidence. Appellees' testimony was not 
proffered at a hearing, nor have Appellees' ever taken the stand and given testimony in Rex 
Strand's divorce proceeding. The hearing on the GAL's motion was held in camera and 
Allen was not allowed to attend, as per the GAL's request. Also, neither of the Appellees' 
were even at the Court house the day of the hearing. Further, Allen filed an affidavit refuting 
the allegations of the Appellees' and the GAL whereupon the GAL refused personal service 
throwing said affidavit on the floor, and said affidavit was stricken from the record for lack 
of standing. 
Because of said lack of standing in the divorce proceeding, the unusual personal 
involvement between the GAL and the Appelleess' and the unusual and illegal 
un-involvement of DFS, the Constitutional rights and the rights under the Utah State child 
abuse reporting statutes afforded to Allen and all other citizens were intentionally abridged 
by the Appellees' and the GAL. 
Allen, who was wrongfully accused of various acts of child abuse through said 
affidavits, the GAL's Memorandum and the Appellees' February 2006 letters which were 
attached to the affidavits, was never allowed to confront or cross-examine either of the 
Appellees or the GAL who were purportedly witnesses against her, which is the primary 
interest of U.S.C.A. Const Amend 6. 
The fact that the Divorce Court denied the GAL's motion, raises questions of 
relevancy to the divorce proceeding which the trial court should have explored. In it's 
wisdom, the Divorce Court could find no basis, merit or relevancy to the GAL's motion, the 
affidavits or the letters and the trial court should have found same. Pursuant to Utah's child 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
abuse reporting statutes, the Affidavits were in fact false reports of child abuse not entitled 
to immunity. 
Allen implores this court to entertain the following question: In Allen v. Ortez, if the 
Social worker's letters that were sent to the Father's attorney were then subsequently used 
by the Father's attorney 30 day's later to mold an affidavit for the social worker based on 
said letters and then Father's attorney belatedly claimed he had investigated and 
substantiated said allegations by interviewing only the social worker and filed said affidavit, 
letter and report of said investigation into court and a hearing was held were the social 
worker did not appear, her affidavit was not admitted on the record and her testimony was 
not proffered, would this Court have then given absolute immunity to the social worker in 
all respects and find that Utah's child abuse reporting statutes were irrelevant? Exchanging 
social worker to Appellee's and father's attorney to GAL, this is precisely what has 
happened in this case except at least with regard to Allen v. Ortez, the accused were parties 
to the divorce proceeding and could defend themselves and face their accusers whereas the 
Appellant was not a party to the divorce proceeding, could not defend herself and could not 
face her accusers. 
On their own initiative, the Appellees' pretended to be witnesses to acts of child 
abuse based upon information they fabricated and concocted to satisfy their own malicious 
motives and further directed said libelous communications to a participant or decision 
maker in litigation with impunity and without the threat of cross-examination, simply by 
violating Utah's child abuse reporting statutes and the Appellants' constitutional rights. This 
behavior shocks not only the conscience but the integrity of the judicial system. The 
underlying justification for the absolute privilege does not necessitate such license. 
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For these reasons and the reasons set forth in Allen's initial Brief, this court must, 
therefore reverse and remand. 
D. THE APPELLEE'S LACK OF REPORTING 
Interestingly the Appellees' assert the following three propositions for their lack of 
reporting to DFS: (1.) that the children were protected from potential abuse and neglect 
partially by the very acts of the reports to the GAL, (2.) that the lack of reporting to DFS did 
not negatively affect the children and (3.) that the statements, letters and affidavits provided 
to the Guardian ad litem in the divorce action provided the very protection needed. 
Appellees' conclude said propositions with the assertion that it would be absurd to 
chill a citizen's inclination to describe a concern to the Guardian ad litem, solely because that 
citizen had not previously also reported that concern to another official designated to protect 
minors and this would have an adverse impact on child abuse reporting and contrary to sound 
policy. 
Allen v. Ortez dealt specifically with these issues and found that the social worker 
reporting to attorneys and the commissioner were liable and violated Utah's child abuse 
reporting statutes. 
First, the GAL took no action to protect the children for 41 day's after she received 
the first letter reporting child abuse. Utah's child abuse reporting statutes states that in order 
to protect children, reports must be made immediately to DFS and or law enforcement. Thus 
the children were not protected. 
11 
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Secondly, the lack of reporting did not negatively affect the children only because the 
reports were false. If the reports had been true the children would have been negatively 
affected for 41 days. 
Lastly, this Court must not conclude that the statements, letters and affidavits 
provided to the GAL, provided the children protection. This erroneous assertion lacks 
credulity. How are children protected by allegations that they are being subjected to child 
abuse that go unreported to law enforcement or DFS while GAL's take 41 day's to 
manufacture a ill-conceived case? 
The law is well settled if a person has reason to believe children are being abused they 
must make a report to law enforcement or DFS immediately. Along with being a school 
teacher Appellee Ferrari is a self professed professional with experience in these matters , 
making her lack of reporting to DFS more egregious. Moreover, Ferrari's and Dimeo's 
fabricated allegations made as retribution against Rex Strand are outrageous, intolerable 
and shocks the conscience. 
For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in Allen's initial Brief, this court must, 
therefore, reverse and remand. 
E. SLANDER CLAIMS 
As argued in her brief and through her complaint against Appellee Ferrari, Allen 
alleged that in December 2005 Ferrari made certain false and slanderous statements about 
her past to the minor child, Emily Strand [ Ferrari Complaint R. 6-7/ 30, R. 8-9/ 38, R 9/39 
] . Likewise as argued in her brief and through her complaint Allen alleged that in March 
2006 Appellee Dimeo also made certain false and slanderous statements about Allen in front 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of no less than 11 witnesses [ Dimeo Complaint R 7-28, R. 35-38, R 8/34(b)]. Specifically 
in these instances, Allen asserts that these out of court statements had no bearing or 
relevancy to the divorce proceeding. Furthermore the substance of Allen's slander claims in 
total cannot be construed to be related to any inquiry or investigation. The trial court clearly 
erred by not being familiar with the slander claims, and by concluding that the slander claims 
were entitled to judicial privilege. 
Understanding the substance of the slander claims is important because they reflect 
that the trial court clearly erred in dismissing these claims without review and that Allen 
clearly established a cause of action. In their brief the Appellee's skirt these issues with 
irrelevant assertions. Because Allen has lived with Michael Strand for the past 14 years does 
not form a basis for this type of slander and harassment. It should be noted that the children's 
grandmother (Renee Strand's mother) has lived with her boyfriend for at least 10 years and 
he is married to another woman who lives in Mexico. Ferrari herself has cohabitated with no 
less than three men for various periods of time while fulfilling her contract in teaching minor 
children and presumably acting as a role model. Likewise after Appellee Dimeo and her 
husband divorced this past year, Dimeo has also cohabitated with a series of several male 
friends. 
Both Appellees' in fact knowingly and recklessly with actual malice made false 
statements about Allen in 2005 and 2006. Said statements were inappropriate, known by the 
Appellee's to be false, completely unjustified and left un-addressed by the trial court. 
Senate Bill 86 that the Appellees' refer to was not signed until March 14, 2007, 
rendering such bill irrelevant to these 2005 and 2006 statements and furthermore 76-9-404 
still stands. The substance of Appellees' slander (criminal defamation) are not those 
13 
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protected by the constitution. Free speech must be balance against the values protected by the 
law of defamation, invasion of privacy, and abuse of personal identity. 
Additionally IML case cited by the Appellees' refer to written material not oral 
material. Likewise Cari Allen is not a public figure . The constitution does not protect 
speech that is admittedly false, intended to harm, aimed at private citizens, and otherwise 
defamatory. The statements of Appellees' were not made with good motives for justifiable 
ends and damaged Allen's reputation. 
A court simply cannot determine whether a statement is capable of sustaining a 
defamatory meaning by viewing individual words in isolation; rather, it must carefully 
examine the context in which the statement was made, giving the words their most common 
and accepted meaning. Thus a court must consider an entire article to determine whether a 
reasonable reader could infer defamation. The statements of Appellees' were outrageous in 
character, and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be 
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. 
Here, the trail court concluded that the slanderous statements were not outrageous. 
It based its decision without reviewing the substance of the claims, to whom they were made 
and how Allen was affected, and relied simply on the mere fact that Allen lives with her 
boyfriend. 
For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in Allen's initial Brief, this court must, 
therefore, reverse and remand. 
CONCLUSION 
The letters did not qualify for common-law absolute privilege as statements made in 
course of participation injudicial proceedings. As a matter of law, the Appellees' were not 
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acting as witnesses or potential witness in custody modification proceeding when they sent 
letters charging the Appellant's with child abuse to children's guardian ad litem, the fathers 
attorney, the mothers attorney and a number of other untold parties. 
Respondents argue and the district court found that both their written and oral 
statements were made as witnesses in the divorce proceeding and that such statements were 
relevant to the parent time and custody of the minor children. This argument and holding is 
erroneous in fact and law. 
The Appellees have construed the issue's on appeal in a manner which reads in a 
prejudicially unfair and un- neutral manner, completely overlooks and take's entirely out of 
context the nature and substance of Appellants' position and the reasons for her challenge to 
the District Court's ruling. Appellee's ill-conceived, biased and pre-disposed contentions 
should be rejected by this court so that fair and neutral position with regard to Appellant's 
challenges to witness status and relevancy in all respects can be determined by this Court. 
APPELLEES' ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The litigation was not initiated in bad faith or frivolously. Likewise, this appeal was 
made in good faith, is neither frivolous, vexatious nor meritless and presents to this court 
numerous issues which are important and need resolution and seeks the enforcement of well 
established law and the precedence set forth in Allen v. Ortez. 
Appellees' counsel's conduct affected the ability of the finder of fact to comprehend 
the evidence, the claims submitted, and the ability of the finder of fact to perform its duties 
and has sought to do same with this Court. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Tfev day of May, 2007. 
CAR! ALLEN 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the fiMay of May, 2007,1 oauoed two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing REPY BRIEF to be mailed, pootage prepaid to the following: 
Mary C. Corporon 
Allison Librett 
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants 
Corporon & Williams. P.C. 
405 South Main Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
\<(j4sJ MJX T& 3^1 
CARI ALLEN DAT 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RENEE L STRAND vs. REX C STRAND 
CASE NUMBER 054905268 Divorce/Annulment 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
TYRONE E MEDLEY 
CURRENT ASSIGNED COMMISSIONER 
T PATRICK CASEY 
PARTIES 
Petitioner - RENEE L STRAND 
Represented by: FREDERICK N GREEN 
Respondent - REX C STRAND 
Represented by: WENDY J LEMS 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 195.00 
Amount Paid: 195.00 
Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: DIVORCE PETN 
Amount Due: 95.00 
Amount Paid: 95.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VITAL STATISTICS FEE 
Amount Due: 2.00 
Amount Paid: 2.00 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 17.50 
Amount Paid: 17.50 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: AUDIO TAPE COPY 
Amount Due: 10.00 
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be reserved for future hearing; 
13. The telephone call stipulation will be binding only until the 
next hearing if it is not resolved on Thursday in the restraining 
order motion; 
Mr. Green is to prepare and submit the appropriate order. 
03-29-06 Filed: Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Guardian Ad Litem's 
Motion for Temprary Restraining Order 
03-29-06 Filed: Affidavit of Gina Painter 
03-30-06 Filed: STRICKEN ^Affidavit of Michael Strand and Cari Allen 
Dated March 27, 2006 
03-30-06 Filed: Affidavit of Rex Charles Strand in Response to 
Respondent's Affidavit Dated March 27, 2006 
03-30-06 Filed: ***UNSIGNED*** GAL Temporary Restraining Order- Denied. 
03-30-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for SIGNING OF TRO 
Judge: TYRONE E MEDLEY 
Clerk: tinaa 
PRESENT 
Petitioner's Attorney: FREDERICK N GREEN 
Attorney for the minor: DIANA L TELFER 
Attorney for the Respondent: GRANT W. P. MORRISON 
Video 
Tape Number: 9.25 
HEARING 
This matter is before the Court for a hearing on the signing of a 
Temporary Restraining Order. Appearances as stated above. 
s^ Temporary Restraining Order is denied. 
The Court does not preclude the Guardian ad Litem or Mr. Green to 
pursue these issues in front of Commissioner. 
Issues of attorneys fees are reserved. 
Respondent is refrained from having any contact with the Guardian 
Ad Litem. Contact will be made through counsel only. 
Conversation between the GAL and minor children to remain 
confidential and only the guardian will be allowed to talk with the 
children about Court proceedings. 
X Affidavit of Michael Strand and Cari Allen Dated 3/27/06 is hereby 
stricken. 
Grant Morrison to prepare Order and submit Order with in 1 week. 
03-31-06 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 
03-31-06 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 
04-07-06 Filed: Partial Transcript, ruling only, hearing dated 3-30-06, 
Carolyn Erickson, CCT 
04-12-06 Note: Order (hrg 3/28/06) signed by Comm Casey forwarded to 
Printed: 05/07/07 15:49:50 Page 9 
CASE NUMBER 054905268 Divorce/Annulment 
Judge for signature 
04-14-06 Filed order: Order 
Judge tmedley 
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Signed April 14, 2006 
04-17-06 Filed: Notice of Lodging 
04-28-06 Filed: Notice of Hearing on Respondent's Motion for Orders and 
for Contempt Certification (6/6/2006 09:00 AM), ATR 
04-28-06 Filed: Motion for Order and for Contempt Certification, ATR 
04-28-06 Filed: Affidavit in Support of Motion for Temporary Orders, ATR 
05-03-06 LAW AND MOTION scheduled on June 06, 2006 at 09:00 AM in Third 
Floor W-36 with Commissioner CASEY. 
05-11-06 Filed order: Order 
Judge tmedley 
Signed May 11, 2006 
05-12-06 Judgment #1 Entered 
Creditor: RENEE L STRAND 
Debtor: REX C STRAND 
1,800.00 Child Support Arrearage to Mother 
1,800.00 Judgment Grand Total 
05-12-06 Filed judgment: Order (hrg 3/28/06) @J 
Judge tmedley 
Signed May 11, 2006 
05-17-06 Filed return: Subpoena Duces Tecum on Return 
Party Served: Qwest Communications 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: May 11, 2006 
05-19-06 LAW AND MOTION rescheduled on June 23, 2006 at 09:00 AM 
Reason: Conflict in attorney schedule. 
05-23-06 Filed: Stipulation 
05-24-06 Filed: Notice of Rescheduled Hearing (6/23/2006 @ 9:00 AM), 
Mandy L. Rose, GAL 
05-24-06 Filed: Certificate of Service 
05-24-06 Filed order: Order 
Judge tmedley 
Signed May 24, 2006 
< 05-25-06 Filed: Notice of Substitution of Counsel, Mandy L. Rose, GAL 
05-30-06 Filed: Guardian Ad Litem's Motion to Quash Subpoena of 
Investigator's Records, Mandy L. Rose, GAL 
05-30-06 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Guardian Ad Litem's Motion to 
Quash Subpoena of Investigator's Records, Mandy L. Rose, GAL 
06-15-06 Filed: Guardian ad Litem's Motion to Modify Order.Regarding 
First Right of Refusal (Mandy L. Rose, GAL) 
06-16-06 Filed: Notice of Hearing (6/23/2006 @ 9:00 AM), ATP 
06-16-06 Filed: Petitioner's Motion Regarding: 1)Parenting Issues; 
2)Medical Bill Jugement; 3)Possession of Automobile; 
4)Automatic Deposit of Child Support; and 5)Compelling 
Respondent's Cooperation With the Custody Evaluation, ATP 
06-16-06 Filed: Affidavit of Renee L. Strand Date June 16, 2006, ATP 
06-19-06 Filed: Notice of Hearing on GAL's Motion (6/23/06 @ 9:00 AM) 
Printed: 05/07/07 15:49:51 Page 10 
CASE NUMBER 054 905268 Divorce/Annulment 
06-22-06 Filed: Objection to Late Filed Motion of Petitioner and Motion 
to Strike Hearing, ATR 
06-22-06 Filed: Objection to Late Filed Motion of Guardain Ad Litem and 
Motion to Strike Hearing, ATR 
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Former Duchesne County attorney pleads 'no contest" for failing to 
report child abuse 
By Stephen Hunt 
The Salt Lake Tribune 
Salt Lake Tribune 
Article Last Updated:02/22/2007 06:39:51 AM MST 
Posted: 6:41 AM- The case against a former deputy Duchesne County attorney charged with failing to report information about 
the sexual abuse of a child has been resolved with a plea in abeyance. 
Roland Uresk pleaded "no contest" this week in Salt Lake County Justice Court to one count of class B misdemeanor failure to 
report child abuse. 
Judge Shauna Graves-Robertson imposed a $200 fee and said the charge, along with an identical count, will be dismissed in 
12 months if Uresk commits no other crimes. 
In September 2005 and May 2006, Uresk received information over the telephone that Brad Gale - part-owner of Gale's Office 
Supply & Books in Roosevelt and Vernal - was molesting a 14-year-old boy. 
Although the caller mentioned Gale by name, Uresk told The Tribune he took no action because the caller had heard of the 
abuse from someone else. 
Uresk said he advised the caller to have that other person contact him, or for the caller to contact the Utah Division of Child 
and Family Services. 
Prosecutors said that other person finally did contact police. 
«- Utah law requires citizens to report suspected child abuse to the division or police. The case was filed in Salt Lake County 
because the person who called Uresk made the call from Salt Lake County, said Assistant Utah General Michael Wims. 
Gale was subsequently charged with sexually abusing the boy in Duchesne and Utah counties, in July and September, 
respectively. 
Earlier this month, Gale was sentenced to 15 years in federal prison for photographing the boy engaging in sexual acts. 
Gale is to be sentenced March 29 in Roosevelt's 8th District Court, where he has pleaded guilty to four first-degree felonies. 
Another man, 76-year-old John West, pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor count of sexual battery for watching Gale sexually 
abuse the boy in Utah County. West was sentenced to two weeks in jail. 
On Wednesday, Wims called the settlement of Uresk's case "a fair and just resolution of the matter." 
Uresk was a part-time civil attorney for Duchesne County until December, when his contract expired and the county 
commission declined to renew it. 
shunt(g)sltrib.com 
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